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NOTE 
DEFINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY: 
TOWARD A PRECISE 
APPLICATION OF AGENCY 
PRINCIPLES IN TITLE VII 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES 
"[I]n spite of whatever social enlightenment our nation might 
have achieved in the wake of the civil rights movement, the 
various anti-discrimination laws enacted by [C]ongress, and 
such consciousness raising events in our nation's history as the 
Anita Hill / Clarence Thomas hearings, the nation's workplaces 
are still filled with those who are eager to exploit their positions 
of authority and act motivated by discriminatory animus.,,1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Kimberly Ellerth sued Burlington Industries, Inc. (hereinaf-
ter "Burlington") for sexual harassment based on the actions of 
her supervisor, Ted Slowik.2 Ellerth brought her claims under 
1. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(Castillo, J.), rev'd, 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 123 F.3d 
490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) [hereinafter "Ellerth In). 
2. See id. at 1105-1106. Slowik was not Ellerth's immediate supervisor. 
Throughout her employment at Burlington, Ellerth reported to a supervisor in 
Burlington's Chicago office. Her immediate supervisors, in turn, reported to Slowik. 
[d. at 1106. 
235 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Bur-
lington's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Ellerth's 
claims with prejudice. 4 
Ellerth appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 5 The panel reversed the district court's 
decision. 6 Burlington moved for a rehearing en banc, which· 
was granted. 7 On rehearing, a majority of the court agreed 
that Ellerth presented enough evidence to survive summary 
judgment on a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 8 
Burlington then petitioned the Supreme Court for certio-
rari.9 The Supreme Court granted review to resolve differing 
views among the federal courts and to establish a standard for 
employer liability in sexual harassment cases. 10 The Court 
held that, even in cases where the employee did not suffer a 
tangible employment action, the employer is vicariously liable 
unless it can establish an affirmative defense. 11 The Court de-
fined the affirmative defense as a two-element test. 12 The first 
element requires the employer to prove it took reasonable ac-
tion to prevent and correct the harassment. 13 If it did, the sec-
ond element requires the employer to prove that the employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective measures 
available to her. 14 If the employer proves both elements of the 
3. See id. at 1105. 
4. See id. at 1124. 
5. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated en 
bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Ellerth WJ. 
6. See id. at 863. 
7. See id. 
8. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (en 
bane) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Ellerth III"). Ellerth waived her claim of hostile 
environment harassment on her appeal. The grant of summary judgment dismissing 
Ellerth's claim for hostile environment was therefore affirmed. Id. 
9. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998). 
10. See id. at 2264. 
11. See id. at 2270. 
12. See id. 
13. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. 
14. See id. For ease of reference and because women are overwhelmingly the 
victims of sexual harassment, this note will use feminine pronouns to refer to plaintiffs 
in general. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 
28 (1979). 
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defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it will not be held 
vicariously liable. 15 
Section II of this note discusses applicable principles and 
law in sexual harassment cases, including Title VII, Equal 
EmploYment Opportunity Commission Guidelines, agency 
principles, and case law that illustrate two primary approaches 
taken by the courts in determining the standard for employer 
liability. This section also discusses relevant portions of the 
first Supreme Court case to address sexual harassment under 
Title VII. Section III discusses the facts that gave rise to EI-
lerth's sexual harassment claims. Section IV discusses the pro-
cedural history of Ellerth's case, including the district court's 
decision, the decision of the Seventh Circuit panel that heard 
Ellerth's appeal and the en banc decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit. Section V discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in El-
lerth v. Burlington Industries in the context of sexual harass-
inent law under Title VII. Section VI offers a critique of the 
Supreme Court's analysis, asserting that it is inconsistent with 
agency principles. Finally, Section VII concludes that a bright-
line standard of employer liability, based on agency principles, 
. is necessary in Title VII sexual harassment cases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII 
Congress enacted Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (hereinafter ''Title VII" or "the Act").16 Title VII prohibits 
employers from discriminating against a person because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin}7 Prohibited dis-
crimination may include termination, refusal to hire, or any 
[d. 
15. See id. 
16. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986). 
17. See 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)( 1): 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
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other practice which alters a person's "compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment."18 Title VII also forbids 
segregation and discriminatory classification of workers when 
these practices adversely impact the status of the employee. 19 
Finally, Title VII prohibits practices that explicitly discrimi-
nate against workers as well as those that are facially neutral 
but have a discriminatory effect. 20 
Courts recognized sexual harassment as discrimination un-
der Title VII by drawing an analogy to race-based harass-
ment.21 Like the use of racial epithets by co-workers, harass-
ment based on sex is a barrier to equality in the workplace. 22 
This argument is rooted in the language of Title VII itself. 23 
The "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" include 
the right to work in an environment that is free from the psy-
chologically harmful effects of discrimination. 24 
B. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM:ISSION 
GUIDELINES 
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to effectuate the provisions of Title VII. 25 
In this capacity, the EEOC receives complaints from victims of 
employment discrimination. 26 In order to assist in the investi-
gation of victims' claims of discrimination, the EEOC developed 
guidelines defIning the conduct that constitutes sexual har-
Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2): 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, 
segregate, or classiJY his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
20. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 230 (1971). 
21. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). 
22. See id. 
23. See 42 U.s.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
24. Henson, 682 F.2d at 901 (quoting 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(l)). 
25. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a). "The commission is empowered, as hereinafter 
provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practices 
as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title." Id: 
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
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assment under Title VII, as well as the role of the employer in 
preventing and correcting sexual harassment in the work 
place. 27 The guidelines describe the EEOC's standards for as-
sessing employee claims of work place harassment. 28 The 
guidelines are not binding on the COurtS.29 However, courts 
and litigants properly rely upon the guidelines because they 
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment" that 
can be useful in deciding sexual harassment cases.3O 
In evaluating claims of work place harassment, the guide-
lines instruct the EEOC to examine the "totality of the circum-
stances" to determine whether sexual harassment has oc-
curred.31 The "totality of the circumstances" includes the na-
ture of the conduct as well as the facts surrounding the con-
duct.32 Accordingly, the guidelines describe conduct that 
amounts to sexual harassment as well as the circumstances 
that may give rise to a finding of sexual harassment.33 Prohib-
ited conduct includes "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature.'>34 
After identifying the types of prohibited conduct, the guide-
lines go on to describe three situations in which such conduct 
amounts to sexual harassment.35 First, sexual harassment 
arises when the employee's submission to the advances is made 
a term or condition of employment.36 Second, sexual harass-
ment occurs when the employee's submission, or the lack of it, 
[d. 
27. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. 
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(b). 
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
30. [d. (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141·142 (1976)). 
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b): 
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the 
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the 
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in 
which the alleged incidents occurred. The legality of a particular action will 
be made from the facts, on a case by case basis. 
32. [d. 
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
34. [d. 
35. See id. 
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(l). "[Slubmission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment." [d. 
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is the basis of employment decisions affecting the employee. 37 
These are commonly known as "quid pro quo" sexual harass-
ment.38 Third, sexual harassment arises when conduct "has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
vidual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive working environment. "39 This form of harassment 
is commonly known as "hostile environment" sexual harass-
ment.40 
Regardless of which of the three types of harassment a 
plaintiff claims or whether the harassment results in a tangible 
employment action, the guidelines state that employers are 
vicariously liable for sexual harassment when it is committed 
by a supervisor. 41 Thus, even when employers forbid sexual 
harassment, the employer is vicariously liable for a supervi:' 
sor's harassment. 42 Moreover, an employer will be vicariously 
liable even when it did not know that sexual harassment oc-
curred.43 
The strict vicarious liability approach outlined above has 
not prevailed in most courts, in part because the EEOC, then 
headed by Clarence Thomas, shifted its position. 44 Thomas 
urged Solicitor General Charles Fried to submit an amicus 
brief to the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,45 the fIrst sexual harassment case decided by the Su-
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11{a)(2). "[S]ubmission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 
[d. 
38. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11{a)(3). 
40. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
41. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c). Some commentators refer to this as "strict 
vicarious liability" because the imposition of vicarious (as opposed to direct liability 
based on employer negligence) liability is strict. Vicarious liability is imposed in all 
cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, 
Professor of Law at Golden Gate University School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. 
(October 27, 1998). 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability 
of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 124 (1995) (citing David G. Savage, Thomas Fought Workplace Harassment, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A6). 
45. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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preme COurt.46 In the brief, the Solicitor General urged that 
the appropriate standard for imposing liability on employers 
for a hostile work environment should be negligence. 47 Thus, 
whether an employer has a sexual harassment policy and com-
plaint procedure, combined with the harassment victim's fail-
ure to use them, should insulate an employer from vicarious 
liability. 48 The Meritor Court relied heavily on that reasoning 
to conclude that agency principles limited employer liability. 49 
Since then, the guidelines' strict vicarious liability standard 
has been imposed in some circuits, but not in others, and has 
not been followed by the Supreme Court. 50 
C. AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 
1. The Rationale for Applying Agency Principles to Sexual 
Harassment 
Congress intended agency principles to determine the stan-
dard of employer liability under Title VII. 51 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court relied on Title VII's defInition of an "employer," 
46. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amici Curiae at 10·13, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(No. 84·1979); Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 122 (stating that Meritor was the 
Supreme Court's first opportunity to address sexual harassment under Title VII). 
47. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amici Curiae at 6-7 (stating that employer liability depended on 
whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to 
provide appropriate redress). 
48. See id. at 26. This position directly contradicts the 1980 EEOC guidelines. 
See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(c) (stating that an employer's policy against sexual harassment 
and/or knowledge of sexual harassment in the workplace do defeat vicarious liability). 
49. See Meritor, 477 U.s. at 71-72 (quoting extensively from the amicus brief and 
stating that it was appropriate to consider the circumstances of each case rather than 
impose a bright-line rule). The Court stated in the next paragraph that agency 
principles limited employer liability. See id. 
50. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amici Curiae at 10-13, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(No. 84-1979). 
51. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(b). "The term employer means a person engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, and any agents of such a person." See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(c) ( "Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible for its 
acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual 
harassment .... " ). 
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including language like the "agents of such a person," to sup-
port its use of agency principles in deciding discrimination 
cases.52 Accordingly, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the 
Court suggested that the Restatement (Second) Agency, section 
219 (hereinafter "Section 219") was a useful starting place for 
determining whether an employer should be liable for sexual 
harassment.53 
2. Applying Section 219 to Sexual Harassment 
Agency principles apply to workplace sexual harassment be-
cause they describe employers' responsibilities arising out of 
the injurious conduct of their employees. 54 Therefore, a proper 
interpretation of common law agency principles is essential to 
formulating the correct rule for employer liability in sexual 
harassment cases. 55 
Section 219 describes several situations in which an em-
ployer may be liable for the torts of his employee. 56 Generally, 
an employer is liable for injuries caused by an employee while 
he is acting within the scope of his employment. 57 The assump-
tion underlying this rule is that an employer can control an 
employee's conduct when the employee is acting within the 
scope of his service to the employer.58 Because the employer 
exercises such control, it is responsible for harm that results 
from the employee's conduct. 59 
52. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
53. See id. 
54. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 77. 
55. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 141. 
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). 
57. See id. For ease of reference, and because harassers are often male 
supervisors, masculine pronouns will be used to refer to supervisors. See MACKINNON, 
supra note 14, at 28 (1979) (citing the Working Women United Survey. Of 155 women 
surveyed, forty percent were harassed by their male supervisors). The Restatement 
defmes scope of employment as follows: "1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of 
employment if, but only if: a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; b) it occurs 
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; c) it is actuated, at least in 
part, by a purpose to serve the master, and d) if force is intentionally used by the 
servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957). . 
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) cmt. a (1957). 
59. See id. The classic example is where the driver of a delivery vehicle causes an 
auto accident while he is making deliveries. Because the driver was doing his job 
8
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The Restatement also describes four situations in which 
employers may be liable for an employee's acts that occur out-
side the scope of his or her employment. 60 First, employers may 
be liable when they intended the employee to harm so~eone. 61 
Second, employers may be liable when they are themselves 
negligent or reckless. 62 Third, employers may be liable when 
the employee's conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the 
employer.63 The comments to the Restatement describe these 
three categories as situations in which employers are either 
guilty of tortious conduct or are legally responsible for the em-
ployee's tortious conduct. 64 
The fourth situation described in Section 219 is different be-
cause the employers are not themselves guilty of tortious con-
duct.65 Rather, the employer is vicariously liable based on his 
relationship with the employee.66 This standard encompasses 
two distinct, but related situations.67 In the first, employers 
may be liable when their employee acts or speaks on behalf of 
(driving) at the time of the accident, his employer can be liable for the plaintiffs 
injuries. The rationale is that the employer can control the competence of drivers when 
their conduct (driving) is within the scope (time period, duties) of their employment. 
See id. 
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957). 
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a) (1957). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 cmt a. (1957). This rule comes from tort law, 
which holds people liable for the acts of others when they cause and intend an act or 
result. For an example, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 illus. 1 (1957): 
the employer tells his employee to shoot anyone who enters his property. A customer 
rightfully enters the property and the employee shoots him. The employer is liable 
because he intended the act and/or the consequences. See id. 
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1957). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1957). For example, an employer 
may be liable for his negligence or recklessness when he hires someone that he has 
reason to believe will harm others. See id. This is direct, as opposed to vicarious, 
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1957). 
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(c) (1957). A non-delegable 
duty is a kind of vicarious liability, where a statute, contract, charter or franchise, or 
the common law imposes a duty on an employer. The employer may not delegate his 
responsibilities under this duty to someone else, like an agent or contractor. A classic 
example is the duty of common carriers to transport their passengers safely. See W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 at 511 (5th ed. 
1984). 
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1957). 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d) (1957). 
9
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the employer and someone else relied on this "apparent 
authority.'>68 In the second, employers may be liable if the em-
ployee was "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 
the agency relation. "69 Either of these situations may provide a 
basis for employer liability.70 In other words, under a correct 
reading of agency principles, a plaintiff does not have to prove 
the existence of both sets of circumstances. 71 
The two situations are related because there is a certain de-
gree of overlap between them.72 For example, a supervisor may 
sexually harass a subordinate, asserting that he has the 
authority to terminate her if she does not submit. 73 Believing 
that he has this authority, she submits to avoid being termi-
nated.74 In that situation, the supervisor has asserted his 
authority to terminate the victim, whether he has it (actual 
authority) or not (apparent authority).75 The fact that he is, in 
fact, a supervisor and he used his status to perpetuate the har-
assment may also give rise to liability based on the agency re-
lation standard because he could not have perpetuated the 
harassment if he was not a supervisor.76 
D. SEXUAL HARAsSMENT CASE LAW 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth, the federal 
courts could not agree on how to determine employer liability 
in sexual harassment cases.77 In some cases, the court deter-
mined that the standard of employer liability hinged on 
whether the victim claimed quid pro quo or hostile environ-
ment harassment. 78 In other cases, however, the court imposed 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 
70. See id. The Restatement uses the disjunctive: "... or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." [d. 
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d) (1957). 
72. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 861-862. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 861-862. 
76. See id. 
77. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 131. 
78. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. "In the classic quid pro quo case an employer is 
strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisors, while in the [hostile) work environment 
10
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vicarious liability to both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
claims. 79 The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson did not articulate a bright-line standard, 
so the conflict summarized above continued after the Meritor 
decision.80 
Before and after Meritor, sexual harassment was actionable 
under Title VII in two general forms; quid pro quo harassment 
and hostile environment harassment.81 Quid pro quo harass-
ment occurred when a supervisor relied on his authority to re-
quire sexual favors from employees.82 If the employee refused, 
the supervisor exercised his power to terminate or discipline 
the employee.83 A tangible employment action was the defming 
feature of the quid pro quo type of harassment.84 Plaintiffs 
could not claim quid pro quo harassment unless they could 
prove a tangible employment action, such as termination or a 
disciplinary action. 85 
Hostile environment harassment, in contrast, was a situa-
tion in which the victim "[ran] a gauntlet of sexual abuse."86 
The victim typically did not suffer a tangible employment ac-
tion, such as demotion or termination, but the treatment she 
endured substantially altered her working conditions. 87 For 
example, the victim may have been so distraught by the har-
asser's conduct that she missed work.88 As a rule, the "mere 
utterance" of a sexual remark was not enough to alter the vic-
tim's working conditions.89 Rather, the plaintiff must have suf-
case, the plaintiff must prove that higher management knew or should have known of 
the sexual harassment before the employer may be held liable." [d. 
79. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,780 (2d Cir. 1994). 
80. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 131. Meritor was the Supreme Court's 
first opportunity to address sexual harassment under Title VII. 
81. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
86. [d. at 902. 
87. See id. 
88. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
89. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1972)). 
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fered severe or pervasive harassment to' claim hostile work en-
vironment harassment under Title VII. 90 
1. Henson v. City of Dundee: Employer Liability Depends on 
Type of Claim 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
was one of the first federal circuits to address the issue of 
whether sexual harassment constituted discrimination under 
Title VII.91 In Henson v. City of Dundee92, the plaintiff, Bar-
bara Henson, was a dispatcher for the city of Dundee's police 
department.93 After working there for two years, she quit and 
sued the city of Dundee for sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII.94 She claimed that her supervisor, John Sellgren, 
sexually harassed her by refusing to promote her unless she 
engaged in sexual activity with him, and that he created a hos-
tile work environment. 95 
Because Henson claimed both quid pro quo and hostile envi-
ronment harassment, the court addressed employer liability as 
to both types of claims.96 The court stated that the type of har-
assment the victim claimed determined whether an employer 
would be vicariously liable.97 According to the Henson court, in 
quid pro quo cases it was appropriate to find the employer vi-
cariously liable because the supervisor misused the authority 
delegated to him by the employer. 98 Thus, the employer's li-
ability derived from the agency relationship. 99 
In contrast, the employer's liability for creating a sexually 
hostile work environment derived from its own negligence in 
90. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
91. See Henson, 682 F.2d 897. 
92. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
93. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 899. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at 899-900. Henson claimed both quid pro quo harassment based on 
the supervisor's refusal to promote and a hostile work environment consisting of severe 
or pervasive sexual harassment. See id. 
96. See id. at 910. 
97. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
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failing to correct the harassment. loo The court held that direct 
liability, rather than vicarious liability, was the appropriate 
standard in hostile environment cases because the supervisor 
acted outside the scope of his authority in harassing the em-
ployee-victim.101 The reason for the difference in treatment was 
that, in a hostile work environment case, unlike a quid pro quo 
case, the supervisor did not misuse the authority delegated to 
him by the employer to take action against the employees that 
report to him. 102 Instead, he acted according to his own inten-
tions, not those of the employer.103 Moreover, the court noted 
that any person in the workplace is capable of creating a hos-
tile work environment for another employee. 104 The ability to 
fill a work environment with sexual innuendoes and insults 
does not depend on the amount of authority the employer 
grants to the individual. 105 Thus, co-employee harassment, as 
opposed to harassment by a supervisor, does not subject the 
employer to vicarious liability.l06 The same conduct by a super-
visor, because it can happen regardless of the harasser's posi-
tion, is also not subject to vicarious liability. 107 
2. Karibian v. Columbia University: Employer Liability 
Does Not Depend on the Type of Claim 
In Karibian v. Columbia University,l08 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the defendant 
employer vicariously liable for a hostile work environment cre-
ated by one of its supervisors.l09 Sharon Karibian worked in 
Columbia University's fundraising office. 110 She worked there 
for three years, until the office closed in 1990. III Mark Urban 
was the Development Officer for Annual Giving and supervised 
100. See id. 
101. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). 
109. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. 
110. See id. at 775. 
111. See id. at 775-776. 
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the office. 112 From the beginning of her employment, Urban 
pressured Karibian to engage in sexual activity with him. 113 
After leaving the university, Karibian sued under Title VII for 
sex discrimination, asserting both hostile environment and 
quid pro quo sexual harassment claims. 114 
In stark contrast to the Henson approach, the Karibian 
court's imposition of vicarious liability did not depend on 
whether the plaintiff claimed quid pro quo or hostile environ-
ment harassment. 115 The court reasoned that it was inappro-
priate to apply different standards of employer liability to quid 
pro quo and hostile environment claims because the conduct of 
the supervisor is essentially the same in both situations. 116 
Instead, the court dermed two standards for vicarious liability 
that followed traditional agency principles. 117 
Thus, under the Karibian court's approach, when a supervi-
sor created a sexually hostile work environment, the employer 
was liable in either of the following two situations. 118 First, the 
employer was liable if the supervisor used his actual or appar-
ent authority to further the harassment. 119 An example of this 
comes from the facts of Karibian itself. 120 There, Karibian's 
working conditions varied noticeably depending on her re-
sponse to Urban; for example, whether she received raises or 
promotions depended on whether she had been receptive to his 
advances. 121 Second, the employer was liable if the agency rela-
tionship helped the supervisor create the hostile work envi-
ronment. l22 Again, the facts of Karibian illustrate this rule. 123 
112. See id. at 775. 
113. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 776. 
114. See id. at 776·777. 
115. See id. at 781. 
116. See id. The court stated that "it would be a jarring anomaly to hold that 
conduct which always renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory does not 
result in liability to the employer when that same conduct becomes so severe and 
pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment." [d. (emphasis 
added). 
117. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 780. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. at 778. 
121. See Karibian. 14 F.3d at 778. 
122. See id. at 780. 
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Karibian claimed that Urban used his authority as a supervi-
sor to force her into an abusive sexual relationship. 124 Pre-
sumably, she would not have submitted had he not been her 
supervisor. 125 
The Karibian court then applied the rule to the facts of the 
case. The plaintiffs continued advancement at Columbia de-
pended on her response to her supervisor's advances, satisfying 
the classic quid pro quo requirements. 126 The fact that she did 
advance, and was not terminated, illustrated the court's point 
that actual economic loss was not necessary to a quid pro quo 
claim. l27 In addition, Urban's repeated advances, remarks, 
threats, and innuendoes also created a hostile working envi-
ronment. l28 The Court found that, given Urban's authority to 
promote and terminate Karibian, the university was liable for 
his creation of a hostile work environment. 129 
3. The Supreme Court Declined to Establish a Bright-Line 
Standard for Employer Liability 
The Supreme Court discussed sexual harassment under Ti-
tle VII for the first time in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. l30 
Mechelle Vinson sued her former employer, Meritor Savings 
B~, for sexual harassment committed by her. supervisor, 
Sydney Taylor. 131 One of the key issues was whether hostile 
environment harassment was actionable under Title VII. 132 
The Court held that it was, and went on to discuss standards of 
employer liability for sexual harassment. 133 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. 
126. See id. at 778. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 780. 
129. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. 
130. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
131. See id. at 60. 
132. See id. at 64. 
133. See id. at 66-73. 
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The Court began by stating that agency principles deter-
mine the standard for employer liability.l34 According to the 
Court, vicarious liability for sexual harassment was most 
clearly appropriate when a supervisor "exercise[d] the author-
ity actually delegated to him by his employer."I35 Thus, when a 
supervisor made decisions that changed an employees status, 
those decisions could be imputed to the employer. 136 In the con-
text of discrimination, a supervisor's decision to terminate an 
employee based on his or her gender would be imputed to the 
employer. 137 
However, Vinson's supervisor did not terminate her because 
of her sex or refusal of his sexual demands. l36 Rather, his per-
sistent advances created a hostile working environment. 139 In 
such a case, the Court stated, the usual agency rule does not 
apply. 140 Unfortunately, the Court did not state an alternative 
rule. 141 Instead, it instructed the courts to rely on the common 
law of agency in determining a standard for employer liabil-
ity.142 The Court further cautioned the lower courts that 
agency principles limited, rather than expanded, employer li-
ability. 143 
Since the Meritor court declined to articulate a bright-line 
standard, courts have been unclear as to the appropriate stan-
dard for employer liability.144 Indeed, courts have taken varied 
approaches both before and after Meritor, underscoring the 
134. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. 
135. [d. 
136. See id. This is commonly known as the scope of employment rule. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) cmt. 1 (1957). 
137. See id. 
138. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. Vinson was terminated for excessive use of sick 
leave. See id. 
139. See id. at 64. 
140. See id. at 70. 
141. See id. at 72. 
142. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
143. See id. This statement has been criticized as dictum. See Oppenheimer, supra 
note 44, at 131. Moreover, after Meritor, not all of the circuits read agency principles to 
limit employer liability. See e.g. Karibian, 14 F.3d 773 (imposing vicarious liability for 
hostile environment harassment, where the supervisor used his delegated authority to 
perpetuate a hostile work environment). 
144. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
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need for a clear standard of employer liability.145 Thus, in El-
lerth, the Supreme Court sought to articulate the agency 
analysis in sexual harassment cases and the rule for imposing 
vicarious liability which subsequent courts could follow. 146 
III. FACTS OF ELLERTH 
Kimberly Ellerth met Ted Slowik in March of 1993 during 
her second interview for a merchandizing assistant position at 
Burlington. 147 On this occasion, Slowik made the first of many 
remarks that Ellerth found offensive. 148 Specifically, he asked 
her if she was married, whether she was planning to have chil-
dren, and whether she and her husband were "practicing" to 
have children. 149 Slowik also stared at her in a sexual way 
throughout the interview, which made her feel uncomfort-
able. l50 
Despite Slowik's conduct during the interview, Ellerth later 
sent a letter to Mary Fitzgerald thanking her for the opportu-
nity to meet with Slowik and stating, "[t]he insight he gave me 
into the position only provided me with more incentive to take 
the job .... "151 About one week after Ellerth's interview with 
Slowik, Fitzgerald offered her the job and she accepted. 152 
Ellerth assisted Fitzgerald in Burlington's Chicago office. l53 
Fitzgerald, in turn, reported to Slowik, who worked in the New 
York office. l54 Despite working in different offices and the geo-
145. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
146. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
147. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1106. Ellerth's first 
interview was with Mary Fitzgerald, who would be one of Ellerth's supervisors in the 
Chicago office. Slowik was the vice president of sales and marketing for Burlington's 
House Mattress Ticking division. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. Id. 
150. See id. 
151. Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106. 
152. See id. 
153. See id. Ellerth assisted Fitzgerald with her day to day activities. Fitzgerald 
was Ellerth's immediate supervisor; Fitzgerald reported to Slowik. See id. 
154. See id. 
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graphical distance between Slowik and Ellerth, Slowik's inap-
propriate behavior toward her continued. 155 
Ellerth traveled frequently as part of her job, primarily for 
training purposes. 156 Her travel took her to New York, San 
Francisco, and North Carolina. 157 Ellerth encountered Slowik 
during some of these tripS.I58 For example, when Ellerth was in 
North Carolina for training, she met with Slowik, another sales 
representative, and his wife for dinner.159 Slowik was loud and 
obnoxious during dinner. ISO Ellerth recalled that he had been 
rude to the waitress, and that she was offended by his con-
duct. 161 After dinner, Ellerth and Slowik went back to the hotel 
in which they were staying. 162 He invited her to accompany 
him to the hotel bar, where an all-women band was playing 
music, and she accepted. l63 Slowik commented favorably on the 
band members' legs, breasts, and revealing outfits. l64 He then 
turned to Ellerth and said that she was "a little lacking in that 
area," referring to her breasts. 165 Ellerth was offended, but did 
. not reply to his remarks. l66 When she did not respond, Slowik 
told her that she should ''loosen up. "167 As Slowik left the bar, 
he told her, "You know, Kim, I could make your life very hard 
or very easy at Burlington."I68 Ellerth took this as a threat, 
155. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1106-1109. 
156. See id. at 1106. 
157. See id. at 1106-1108. During one of the San Francisco trips, at a bedding 
conference, Ellerth saw Slowik often, but he largely ignored her. On the last day of the 
conference, however, Slowik commented on Ellerth's "ass" while staring at her rear. 
Ellerth was so upset that she ran to the bathroom and cried. Id. at 1108. 
158. See id. 
159. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. Although Ellerth could not recall Slowik's specific remarks to and 
about the waitress, Ellerth stated that she was probably offended because the remarks 
were of a sexual nature. See id. 
162. See id. 
163. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107. 
164. See id. 
165. Id. Slowik had been staring at Ellerth's breasts and legs throughout this 
encounter. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107. 
168. Id. 
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meaning she would have to have sex with Slowik to keep her 
job!69 
In the summer of 1993, Ellerth went to New York for 
training. 170 At one point during her trip, Ellerth had lunch 
with Slowik and Angelo Brenna, another Burlington Vice 
President. 171 During lunch, Slowik told sexual jokes and 
rubbed Ellerth's knee under the table. 172 Ellerth moved her leg 
away from Slowik's hand but said nothing.173 She did not think 
Brenna was aware of the incident. 174 After lunch, in Ellerth's 
presence, Slowik commented on Ellerth's legs to Brenna. 175 
Slowik also traveled regularly to Burlington's Chicago office, 
where Ellerth would encounter him.176 In the fall of 1993, 
Slowik was in the Chicago office and saw Ellerth helping an-
other employee fold fabric samples. 177 He said, "[o]n your knees 
again, Kim?"178 Ellerth was offended, believing that Slowik's 
comment referred to oral sex.179 On another of Slowik's visits to 
Chicago, Ellerth found Slowik sitting at her desk making a 
telephone call. ISO He said to her, "[i]t's nice to have my butt 
where your butt was, Kim."181 
In December 1993, Ellerth and her husband encountered 
Slowik at Burlington's Christmas party.182 Slowik remarked to 
Ellerth's husband that he was "a lucky man to have a woman 
like that. "183 Ellerth observed this encounter and assumed that 
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 1106. 
171. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106. 
172. See id. at 1107. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107. 
176. See id. at 1106. "Throughout her employment at Burlington, Ellerth saw 
Slowik, [in Chicago] on average, for a day or two every month or two." ld. 
177. See id. at 1107-1108. 
178. ld. at 1108. 
179. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108. 
180. See id. 
181. ld. 
182. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1108. 
183. ld. 
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Slowik was referring to her.l84 Ellerth also claimed that Slowik 
patted her rear during this party. 185 
In addition to their face to face encounters, Slowik made in-
appropriate comments to Ellerth during their weekly telephone 
conversations. l86 On two occasions, Slowik asked Ellerth what 
she was wearing. 187 On the first occasion, Ellerth had con-
tacted Slowik to get his approval on a customer's order.l88 He 
refused to give his approval, stating, "I don't have time for you 
right now Kim, unless you're telling me - unless you want to 
tell me what you are wearing. "189 On the second occasion, EI-
lerth had called Slowik again to get his approval on the same 
order.l90 He denied approval for the second time. 191 During this 
conversation, Slowik asked, "[a]re you wearing shorter skirts 
yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot 
easier. "192 
Slowik made many other remarks during his conversations 
with Ellerth. l93 Once, Slowik told an offensive joke: "[w]hat is 
the difference between a blonde and a limo? Not everyone has 
been in a limO."194 To Ellerth, who is blonde, this joke implied 
that she was promiscuous. 195 During several other conversa-
tions, Slowik commented on Ellerth's legs. l96 His remarks in-
cluded: "[b]ow are those legs of yours, Kim?" and "lilt must be 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108. 
187. See id. at 1109. 
188. See id. at 1108-1109. 
189. Id. at 1109. 
190. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108. Ellerth claims that this follow-up 
telephone call occurred 1-2 days after her initial call to obtain permission for the 
customer's order. See Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Appendix, 
Exhibit C at 257:11, Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (No. 95 C 0839). 
191. See id. at 1109. 
192. Id. 
193. See id. 
194. Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1108. 
195. See id. at 1115. See David G. Savage, Changing Rules on the Job, ABA J., 
Aug. 1998 at 43 (a photograph of Kimberly Ellerth reveals that she is blonde). 
196. See id. at 1108. 
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hard for a woman like you, Kim, to have a job like that-a 
woman with great legs. "197 
In March of 1994, Slowik interviewed Ellerth for a promo-
tion. 198 During the interview, he rubbed her knee and voiced a 
concern about promoting her because she was "not loose 
enough.nI99 Despite Slowik's "hesitation," Ellerth received the 
promotion.2OO 
Two months after she received the promotion, Patrick Law-
rence, Ellerth's new supervisor, received complaints about her 
from customers and other employees. 201 Lawrence sent Ellerth 
a memorandum regarding the complaints on May 22, 1994.202 
In his memorandum, Lawrence stated that two customers and 
three Burlington employees complained that Ellerth had failed 
to return their telephone calls. 203 
On May 31, 1994, Ellerth informed Lawrence that she was 
quitting.204 At that time, she did not state that the reason she 
quit was Slowik's harassing behavior.205 However, on June 21, 
1994, three weeks after leaving Burlington, Ellerth wrote a 
197. Id. at 1108. 
198. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1108. 
199. Id. Slowik said that he had hesitations about promoting Ellerth because she 
was "arrogant" and not "loose enough" for him. Slowik also stated that he had voiced 
this concern to other people at Burlington. When describing the travel requirements of 
the new position, Slowik asked Ellerth whether her husband would miss her when she 
was away. Id. 
200. See id. Ellerth was promoted to Sales Representative. Patrick Lawrence 
became her immediate supervisor. He reported to Slowik. See id. at 1106. 
201. See id. at 1109. Burlington's Customer Service Manager, Donna Thibideau, 
also received complaints about Ellerth. See id. 
202. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. 
203. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 1996), 
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
204. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. Ellerth informed Lawrence of her 
resignation by both telephone and fax. See id. 
205. See id. Ellerth said that when she wrote the first letter to Lawrence she 
initially included, as one of her reasons, a statement about Slowik's behavior. She 
deleted that statement, on her husband's advice, before faxing the letter to Lawrence. 
See id. 
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letter to Lawrence stating that she had quit because of Slowik's 
harassing behavior. 206 
Throughout Ellerth's employment, Burlington had a policy 
forbidding sexual harassment.207 Ellerth was aware of the pol-
icy and had a copy of the employee handbook, which contained 
a statement of the policy.208 Ellerth's husband advised her that 
complaining might jeopardize her job. 209 Furthermore, Ellerth 
was not aware of how vigilantly the policy was enforced, or if it 
was enforced at all. 210 Ellerth knew that Lawrence, as her su-
pervisor, had a duty to report complaints of sexual harassment 
and Ellerth was afraid Slowik would make her job more diffi-
cult if he knew that she had complained.211 Therefore, Ellerth 
felt her job would be in jeopardy if she complained to Law-
rence.212 Ellerth alleged that she told several employees and 
one Burlington customer about Slowik's behavior.213 However, 
each person denied having had a conversation with Ellerth in 
which she complained of sexual harassment.214 
20S. See id. 
207. See id. at 1118. The policy states, in pertinent part: "The Company will not 
tolerate any form of sexual harassment in the workplace... If you have any questions 
or problems, or if you feel you have been discriminated against, you are encouraged to 
talk with your supervisor or human resources representative or use the grievance 
procedure promptly." Id. 
208. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1109. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 1108. The district court found this assertion insufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material filct, which is necessary to survive summary judgment. See 
id. 
211. See id. at 1109. 
212. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. The facts do not' indicate whether 
Lawrence would have had to tell Slowik that Ellerth had complained. 
213. See id. at 1118 n.12. Ellerth alleged that she complained to Donna Thibideau, 
a customer service manager, between January and March 1994, Sherry Hester and 
Laura Peffal, both customer service representatives, Patrick Crosson, a sales 
representative, and Car a Jimenez, a Burlington customer. None of the other 
employees was a supervisor. See id. 
214. See id. at 1109 n.S. Although each of the people Ellerth complained to denied 
having such a conversation with her, the district court assumed her allegations to be 
true. Because the court was determining whether to grant summary judgment to the 
defendant, it evaluated the facts in the light most favorable to Ellerth. See id. 
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ELLERTH 
A. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
On October 12, 1994, Ellerth filed complaints with the 
EEOC and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. 215 The 
EEOC issued a right to sue letter on November 30, 1994, and 
Ellerth subsequently sued Burlington in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois.216 In her suit, 
Ellerth claimed sex discrimination and constructive discharge 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.217 Ellerth's suit alleged that Slowik in-
appropriately touched her and that he created a hostile work 
environment.218 She further alleged that Slowik's conduct re-
sulted in her constructive discharge.219 
Burlington moved for summary judgment, which the district 
court granted 220 The court did not doubt that Slowik subjected 
Ellerth to a hostile work environment. 221 The court concluded, 
however, that Burlington could not be liable for Slowik's con-
duct under Title VII because Ellerth could not prove Burling-
215. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 1996), 
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
216. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 853. The EEOC may issue a right to sue letter to a 
complainant at any of several points during the complaint process. A right to sue letter 
simply indicates that a complainant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies. 
Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. School 
of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 19, 1999). 
217. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101,1105 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
218. See id. A hostile work environment is one in which sexual harassment has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the victim's work environment or job 
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. To be 
actionable under Title VII, sexual harassment must be severe or pervasive such that it 
alters the conditions of the victim's employment. The court considered four factors: 
frequency, severity, whether the supervisor's conduct was physically threatening or 
humiliating, and whether the supervisor's conduct unreasonably interfered with the 
victim's work performance. See id. at 1110. 
219. See id. at 1124. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer "makes an 
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an 
involuntary resignation." ld. Constructive discharge, in this context, requires that the 
employer know about abusive working conditions and fail to resolve the problem. See 
id. 
220. See id. 
221. See Ellerth l, 912 F. Supp. at 1114. 
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ton's liability under any of the three agency principles it ap-
plied. 222 
Under the fIrst theory of liability, Burlington would be vi-
cariously liable if Slowik's actions were within the scope of his 
employment.223 The district court found that an employer is not 
vicariously liable for the supervisor's acts if the supervisor's 
intent is ''too little actuated by a purpose to serve the mas-
ter."224 In this case, the court found no evidence indicating that 
Slowik's conduct was motivated in any way by a purpose to 
serve Burlington.225 Therefore, the court concluded, Burlington 
could not be held liable under this theory. 226 
Under the second theory of liability, Burlington would be li-
able for acts committed outside the scope of Slowik's employ-
ment if Burlington was negligent or reckless. 227 Negligence and 
recklessness require that Burlington knew or should have 
known about the harassment. 228 Once Burlington discovered 
the hostile work environment, it had a duty to take reasonable 
steps to correct the harassment.229 The court noted that this is 
the most common basis relied upon in sexual harassment 
cases.230 In this case, because Ellerth never informed her su-
pervisor, or anyone else in authority, of Slowik's behavior, 
Burlington never actually knew of Slowik's conduct and could 
222. See id. at 1123. In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the 
Supreme Court held that agency principles determine when an employer is vicariously 
liable for sexual harassment. Accordingly, the District Court applied agency principles 
to determine whether Burlington was liable for Slowik's conduct. See id. at 1116, 1120. 
The three bases for liability are: 1) when the tort is committed within the scope of 
employment, 2) employers are liable for their own negligence or recklessness, and 3) 
masters are liable when the servant relies on "apparent authority" or is assisted in 
accomplishing the tort by the agency relationship. See id. As to the scope of 
employment rule, sexual harassment, of course, is not within anyone's job description. 
Forbidden conduct, however, may be considered within the scope of someone's 
employment ifthe person intends to serve the employer. See id. at 1116. 
223. See id. at 1115. 
224. Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1116. 
225. See id. at 1117. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1118. 
229. See id. at 1118, 1124. 
230. See id. at 1117. 
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not have taken steps to correct the harassment. 231 Therefore, 
the court concluded, Burlington could not be found negligent or 
reckless in failing to correct the hostile work environment. 232 
However, Ellerth responded by arguing that Burlington was 
. vicariously liable because Slowik was a decision-maker in the 
company.233 If Slowik was a decision-maker in the company, 
she argued, his knowledge of the hostile environment could be 
imputed to Burlington.234 The court found this argument un-
persuasive because Slowik, while a vice president, was not high 
enough in the corporate hierarchy to be considered a "decision-
maker.''235 Therefore, Burlington could not be liable for 
Slowik's conduct under this theory. 236 
Under the third agency theory of liability, Burlington would 
be liable if Slowik was assisted by the agency relation when he 
harassed Ellerth.237 The district court reasoned that an em-
ployee is assisted by the agency relation when he purports to 
act for the employer and someone relies on this assertion of 
apparent authority.236 On the surface, this basis seemed to be 
successful for Ellerth because Slowik told her he could make 
her life at Burlington very easy or very hard, depending on her 
reaction to him.239 Thus, it appeared that Slowik did rely on his 
authority as a supervisor when he harassed her.240 The court 
stated, however, that a person who knows the limits of the em-
ployee's (in this case, the supervisor's) authority could not sub-
ject the employer to liability. 241 Ellerth knew that Burlington 
did not authorize Slowik's conduct because she knew it had an 
231. See id. at 1118. 
232. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1118. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. at 1119. An affidavit from Slowik's superior, Salvatore Porio, showed 
that, while Slowik had some decision· making authority, he was not part of the upper 
management who had decision-making and policy-making authority for the whole 
company. [d. at 1119 n.14. 
236. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1119. 
237. See id. at 1120. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1120. 
241. See id. 
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explicit policy against sexual harassment.242 Ellerth possessed 
a copy of the policy and had read it.243 Based on these facts, the 
court concluded that she could not impose vicarious liability on 
Burlington under this theory. 244 
Finally, the court addressed Ellerth's constructive discharge 
claim.245 Constructive discharge occurs only when an employer 
"makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that 
the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation. "246 For 
reasons similar to those articulated in the agency discussion, 
the court found that Ellerth could not claim she was construc-
tively discharged.247 Specifically, the court found that Burling-
ton could not have made Ellerth's working conditions intoler-
able because it was not aware that she was being harassed. 248 
Because Ellerth could not demonstrate Burlington's liability 
for Slowik's harassment, the district court granted Burlington's 
motion for summary judgment. 249 The court dismissed her ac-
tion with prejudice. 250 
B. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
1. The Panel Decision 
Ellerth appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 251 First, the panel addressed whether EI-
lerth's complaint was broad enough to encompass both quid pro 
quo and hostile work environment claims. 252 The panel stated 
242. See id. at 1121. 
243. See id. 
244. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1121. 
245. See id. at 1124. 
246. Id. (citing Weihaupt v. American Med. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
247. See id. 
248. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1124. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. 
251. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 848. 
252. See id. at 854·855. See also discussion infra part II.D. for a discussion of the 
terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment." 
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that the same actions that create a hostile work environment 
can encompass a quid pro quo demand.253 For example, 
Slowik's persistent harassment of Ellerth, in the form of un-
wanted touching and sexual remarks, created a hostile working 
environment.254 Because some of this harassment consisted of 
threats to make Ellerth's work more difficult if she rebuffed' 
Slowik, her claims also encompassed a quid pro quo demand. 255 
Moreover, neither Title VII nor the EEOC demand that a 
plaintiff plead the particular theory of sexual harassment.256 
Applying this reasoning to Ellerth's circumstances, the panel 
found that Slowik repeatedly linked his sexual demands to EI-
lerth's working conditions. 257 Therefore, the court found that 
Ellerth's complaint encompassed allegations of quid pro quo 
and hostile environment harassment.258 
Second, the panel discussed whether the district court prop-
erly applied agency principles. 259 The panel applied the "scope 
of employment" rule that conduct arising out of an employee's 
responsibilities is within the scope of employment, even if the 
particular conduct was forbidden by the employer.260 Applying 
this rule to Ellerth's case, the panel focused on several impor-
tant facts. 261 First, Slowik's harassing conduct occurred during 
working hours and in the work environment. 262 Even when 
Ellerth and Slowik were not in the office, they were conducting 
company business.263 Second, Slowik had substantial authority 
to alter Ellerth's working conditions.264 Burlington gave Slowik 
the authority to hire, to promote, and to assign work to EI-
253. See id. at 855. Conversely, the court stated, the victim of a quid pro quo 
demand is, by definition, the victim of a hostile working environment. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 855. 
256. See id. 
257. See id. (describing the threats Slowik made and the instances in which he 
refused his approval of customer orders unless Ellerth cooperated with his demands or 
answered personal questions). 
258. See id. at 863. 
259. See Ellerth II, 102 F.3d at 856. 
260. See id. at 858. 
261. See id. at 859. 
262. See id. 
263. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 859. 
264. See id. 
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lerth.265 His sexual demands were linked to these responsibili-
ties, making her tolerance of them a condition of her employ-
ment.266 Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the panel 
found that Slowik acted within the scope of his employment 
when he harassed Ellerth.267 As a result, the court found that 
Burlington could be vicariously liable for Slowik's conduct, and 
reversed the grant of summary judgment.268 
2. The En Bane Decision 
Burlington petitioned for rehearing en banc and the Sev-
enth Circuit granted the petition on January 28, 1997.269 The 
case was reargued en banc on February 25, 1997, resulting in 
eight different opinions because the court could not agree on 
the proper standard for employer liability in sexual harass-
ment cases.270 A majority of the court afill"Illed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment against Ellerth's claim of 
hostile environment harassment and reversed the district court 
in favor of her claim of quid pro quo harassment.271 Thus, the 
majority found that Ellerth did not state sufficient facts to pro-
ceed on her claim of hostile environment harassment, but could 
proceed on a claim of quid pro quo harassment.272 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. See Ellerth 11,102 F.3d at 859. 
268. See id. at 859-860. 
269. See id. at 863. Upon rehearing, Ellerth's case was consolidated with that of 
Alice Jansen, a similarly situated plaintiff. The case does not indicate why the petition 
for rehearing was granted. 
270. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam). The opinion does not indicate which judge authored the per curiam opinion. 
Judges Cudahy and Kanne's opinion addressed only Jansen's claims of sexual 
harassment. See supra note 266. The other judges held as follows: Chief Judge Posner 
and Judges Manion and Coffey did not fmd that Ellerth's evidence of quid pro quo 
harassment could survive summary judgment. Chief Judge Posner and Judge Manion 
advocated a Ucompany acts" standard for quid pro quo claims, which essentially 
required more than unfulfilled threats. Judge Coffey advocated a negligence standard 
for all sexual harassment claims and could not fmd sufficient proof of Burlington's 
negligence. The remaining judges (Flaum, Easterbrook, and Wood) concurred in the 
judgment of the court, although they came to that conclusion in different ways. See id. 
at 494. 
271. See id. 
272. See id. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/4
1999] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 263 
Burlington then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United 
States for certiorari. 273 The Court granted certiorari "to assist 
in defming the relevant standards of employer liability. "274 
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth was an attempt to reconcile 
the past, represented by Meritor, with the then current cases 
existing in the federal circuits. Prior to Ellerth, the federal cir-
cuits were split regarding how employers were to be held liable 
for sexual harassment under Title VII. 275 As the Ellerth Court 
observed, the problem was not simply "what standard should 
be applied" but also the application of agency principles that 
lay beneath the standard.276 The agency analysis was a signifi-
cant problem because the various federal courts interpreted 
agency principles differently. 277 The Supreme Court had never 
before articulated the appropriate agency analysis and, in El-
lerth, had the opportunity to break new ground in Title VII 
sexual harassment cases. 
A. THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES TO 
SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 
The central issue before the Court was whether an employer 
should be vicariously liable for a hostile work environment cre-
ated by one of its supervisors.278 The Court applied three rules 
from section 219 of the Restatement of Agency, focusing on the 
273. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998). 
274. [d. at 2264. 
275. See e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (imposing 
vicarious liability only for quid pro quo harassment claims); Karibian v. Columbia 
Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying vicarious liability to both hostile 
environment and quid pro quo claims); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (applying tniditional agency principles to find vicarious liability when the 
harasser is a supervisor). 
276. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998). 
277. See generally Henson, 682 F.2d 897 (imposing vicarious liability only for quid 
pro quo harassment claims); Karibian, 14 F.3d 773 (applying vicarious liability to both 
hostile environment and quid pro quo claims); Miller, 600 F.2d 211 (applying 
traditional agency principles to fmd vicarious liability when the harasser is a 
supervisor ). 
278. See Burlington. 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
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scope of employment rule, negligence, and the agency relation 
standard.279 
The Court fIrst applied the scope of employment rule, which 
states that employers are vicariously liable for torts committed 
by their employees when the employees are acting within the 
. scope of their employment.280 Under the scope of employment 
rule, employers may be liable for both the negligent and inten-
tional torts of their employees. 281 The Court stated that sexual 
harassment is intentional conduct, and applied the scope of 
employment rule for intentional conduct. 282 
Employer liability for intentional conduct arises when the 
employee's intent, "however misguided, is wholly or in part to 
further the employer's business."283 Therefore, even when con-
duct, such as sexual harassment, is forbidden, an employer will 
be liable where its employee intended to serve the employer.284 
The general rule, according to Title VII case law, is that sexual 
harassment is not within the scope of a supervisor's employ-
ment because harassers act according to their own motives, 
with no intent to serve the employer.285 Therefore, because 
Slowik was not acting to serve Burlington, Ellerth could not 
assert that Slowik acted within the scope of his employment 
when he harassed her. 286 
The Court then discussed the second basis for employer li-
ability, negligence.287 Under the negligence standard of section 
219(2)(b), Ellerth would have to prove that Burlington knew or 
should have known that a hostile environment existed as a re-
279. See id. at 2266-2268. Note that negligence is not a basis for vicarious liability. 
Rather, in the sexual harassment context, an employer would be liable for its own 
negligence in failing to prevent or correct sexual harassment. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (2) cmt. e (1957) (stating that, unlike the other standards, 
negligence is the standard when the employer is guilty of tortious conduct). 
280. See id. at 2266. 
281. See id. 
282. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. 
283. [d. 
284. See id. 
285. See id. at 2267. 
286. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. 
287. See id. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/4
1999] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 265 
sult of Slowik's conduct, and that it failed to take reasonable 
steps to stop the harassment.288 Thus, even if a supervisor's 
motives were entirely personal (i.e., he was acting outside the 
scope of his employment), his employer would be liable if it 
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to 
prevent or correct it. 289 The Court noted that negligence is the 
minimum standard of liability imposed by Title VII. 290 How-
ever, because Ellerth did not assert a claim under the negli-
gence standard, the Court did not consider the issue. 291 
The Court then discussed whether the third basis for liabil-
ity, the agency relation standard, would allow Ellerth to impose 
vicarious liability.292 The agency relation standard, stated in 
section 219(2Xd), applies when the supervisor misuses the 
authority delegated to him by the employer.293 This rule, the 
Court noted, is potentially very broad and could cover most of 
the torts that occur in a workplace. 294 Since Meritor limits em-
ployer liability, however, the agency relation standard cannot 
be read so broadly as to cover all harassment in the work-
place. 295 The Court then had to identify the point at which vi-
carious liability would apply. 296 
1. Agency Principles Demand Vicarious Liability Where a 
Tangible Employment Action was Taken Against the Employee 
Following the agency relation standard, vicarious liability is 
most clearly appropriate when the supervisor takes action 
against the employee, usually in the form of termination or de-
nial of a raise or promotion. 297 The Court stated that all of the 
288. See id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (2)(b) (1957)). 
See also discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
289. See id. 
290. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. 
291. See id. 
292. See id. at 2268. 
293. See id. See also discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
294. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. 
297. See id. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
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Courts of Appeals that had addressed this issue found vicarious 
liability in cases where the employee suffered economic injury 
in the form of a tangible employment action. 298 Indeed, the 
Court stated that an employer becomes strictly liable when an 
employee suffers such an economic injury. 299 
The rationale for imposing vicarious liability where the em-
ployee suffered economic injury centers on the employer's rela-
tionship with its supervisors.300 Generally, only supervisors 
can cause economic injuries because the employer vests 
authority in the supervisor to make decisions (such as hiring, 
termination, promotion, and giving raises) that economically 
impact the employees below him.SOI In making decisions that 
are within his authority, the supervisor invokes the official 
power of the employer.302 Thus, the decision to terminate an 
employee, for example, is a "comp~ act. H303 The potential 
clearly exists for the supervisor to misuse his power when 
making these kinds of decisions. 304 Accordingly, when a deci-
sion to terminate is based on sexual harassment, the company 
is vicariously liable under Title VII.306 Since Ellerth did not 
suffer a tangible employment action, however, the Court went 
on to discuss the rationale for imposing vicarious liability when 
no such action was taken against the employee. 306 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits." Id. 
298. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. For the purposes of this discussion, the 
reader should assume that "tangible employment action" refers to "hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change of benefits." Id. 
299. See id. 
300. See id. at 2269. 
301. See id. 
302. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269. 
303. See id. 
304. See id. 
305. See id. 
306. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265, 2269. Ellerth did not suffer a tangible 
employment action because the threats Slowik made to her were not carried out. See 
id. See also discussion supra Part III for a more detailed description of the threats 
Slowik made regarding Ellerth's employment at Burlington. 
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2. The Rationale for Imposing Vicarious Liability When No 
Tangible Employment Action Was Taken Against the Employee 
Whether vicarious liability exists in the absence of a tangi-
ble employment action is a more complicated issue because the 
supervisor's conduct in harassing an employee is not as clearly 
connected to the employer.307 The Court warned that the lan-
guage of the agency relation standard can be read to limit or 
expand the potential for vicarious liability because, in a sense, 
a supervisor is always aided by the agency relation when he 
commits a tort against a subordinate.308 On the one hand, the 
fact that a supervisor's power has a threatening character that 
enables him to commit harassment could be a reason to expand 
employer liability.309 Employees sense that the supervisor is 
"clothed with the employer's authority" and, further, that he 
abuses his authority when he sexually harasses a subordi-
nate.310 
On the other hand, sexual harassment that does not result 
in a tangible employment action often consists of behavior that 
co-workers can engage in, and the supervisor's status, there-
fore, makes little diffe~ence to the employee.311 In these cir-
cumstances, it may not be appropriate to apply vicarious li-
ability automatically, because it could lead to strict vicarious 
liability for sexual harassment regardless of the harasser's po-
sition in the company.312 Because of this tension, as well as 
Meritor's demand that agency principles be read to limit the 
imposition of vicarious liability, the Ellerth court declined to 
automatically impose vicarious liability in the absence of a tan-
gible employment consequence.313 
307. See id. at 2269. 
308. See id. 
309. See id. 
310. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring». 
311. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269. 
312. See id. at 2270. 
313. See id. 
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B. THE COURT'S HOLDING 
The Court ultimately held that, in cases where the employee 
did not suffer tangible employment consequences, the employer 
is subject to vicarious liability unless it can prove an affirma-
tive defense.314 The Court further defined the affIrmative de-
fense as consisting of two elements.315 The fIrst element re-
quires the employer to prove it took reasonable action to pre-
vent and correct the harassment.316 If it did, the second ele-
ment requires the employer to prove that the employee-victim 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective measures 
available to her.317 If the employer proves both elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, it is not vicariously liable for a 
hostile work environment created by one of its supervisors. 318 
Thus, Burlington was subject to vicarious liability for 
Slowik's creation of a hostile environment.319 However, because 
Ellerth did not allege that she suffered a tangible employment 
action, on remand, Burlington may assert the affirmative de-
fense the Court established.32O 
314. See id. 
315. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. 
316. See id. 
317. See id. 
318. See id. In proving the first element of the defense, the existence of a sexual 
harassment policy is not necessary as a matter of law, but whether a policy exists is 
relevant. The existence of a policy, as a practical matter, notifies employees of their 
opportunity to come forward with complaints of harassment. Interview with David B. 
Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. School of Law, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Oct. 27,1998). Accordingly, an employee's failure to use her employer's complaint 
procedure "will normally suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the second 
element of the defense." [d. 
319. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271. 
320. See id. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/4
1999] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 269 
C. THE COURT REJECTED A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO 
DETERMINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
Much of the reasoning behind the Court's holding involved 
the use of the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" 
in sexual harassment cases.321 Specifically, the Court ad-
dressed whether the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile envi-
ronment" should determine the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity.322 This issue was before the Court because the district 
court upheld the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment which determined whether vicarious 
liability would apply.323 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit panel 
applied traditional agency principles and found Burlington li-
able based on the scope of employment rule.324 The Seventh 
Circuit, en bane, was split on whether Burlington was vicari-
ously liable.325 Thus, the Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to reject the use of "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" as 
categories of harassment that determined the standard for em-
ployer liability.326 The Court took this opportunity, and held 
that the terms were not useful for formulating a standard of 
employer liability. 327 
To illustrate its point, the Court noted that a trier of fact 
could find threats of retaliation in Slowik's remarks to EI-
lerth.328 However, Slowik's failure to carry out his threats 
would remove Ellerth's claim from the quid pro quo category of 
sexual harassment.329 If Slowik had carried out his threats, 
Ellerth would have had a claim of quid pro quo harassment, 
which automatically subjects the employer to vicarious liabil-
321. See id. at 2265. 
322. See id. 
323. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(pointing out that there is a doctrinal inconsistency in imposing vicarious liability for 
quid pro quo harassment but not for hostile environment harassment). In keeping 
with that inconsistency, the district court applied a negligence standard to EIierth's 
hostile environment claim. See id. at 1117. 
324. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 863 (7th Cir. 1996). 
325. See Ellerth Ill, 123 F.3d 490. 
326. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
327. See id. 
328. See id. 
329. See id. at 2265. Rather, Ellerth's claim would be one of hostile environment 
harassment. See id. 
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ity.330 Because prior cases held out the promise of vicarious 
liability only in quid pro quo cases, Ellerth only pressed her 
quid pro quo claim when she sought to impose vicarious liabil-
ity on Burlington. 331 
However, Ellerth's quid pro quo claim was not very strong 
because she did not suffer a tangible employment action such 
as termination or denial of a raise or promotion.332 Thus, one of 
the issues facing the district court was whether Ellerth's claim 
was really one of hostile environment sexual harassment with 
a quid pro quo component.333 The Supreme Court resolved this 
issue by stating that the type of claim was not dispositive in 
determining whether employers could be vicariously liable for 
sexual harassment.334 Rather, a determination of vicarious li-
ability would depend on whether the employer could satisfy the 
affirmative defense the Court established.335 
The Court noted several justifications for its rejection of the 
categorical approach. 336 First, the terms do not appear in the 
text of Title VII, indicating that Congress did not intend for 
liability to depend on the type of claim.337 Rather, the terms 
fIrst appeared in academic literature and were used to describe 
conduct that amounted to sexual harassment.338 Second, the 
terms served only a limited purpose in Meritor, where the Su-
preme Court was deciding whether sexual harassment consti-
tuted employment discrimination.339 Essentially, for the Meri-
tor Court, determining the type of the claim was a threshold 
question of whether sexual harassment had occurred. 340 In 
330. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
331. See id. at 2271. Prior cases did not impose vicarious liability for hostile 
environment cases. See discussion infra Part II.D.l. 
332. See id. at 2264, 2265. 
333. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1121. The problem with a "hybrid" claim was, of 
course, that the court would not know which standard to apply if the type of claim 
determined whether vicarious liability would apply. See id. 
334. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
335. See id. at 2270. 
336. See id. at 2264-2265. 
337. See id. at 2264-2265 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
338. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)). 
339. See id. 
340. See id. at 2265. 
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Meritor, the terms were not used to determine the standard for 
employer liability; that question was resolved by the applica-
tion of agency principles. 341 Therefore, the Ellerth Court was 
not bound by precedent that imposed different standards de-
pending on the type of claim.342 
. Accordingly, the Ellerth Court outlined principles for im-
posing vicarious liability that did not depend on the labels 
"hostile environment" and "quid pro quO."343 The Court's hold-
ing requires vicarious liability when a tangible employment 
action was taken and allows for vicarious liability in a hostile 
environment-type situation.344 However, unlike a tangible em-
ployment action case, in a hostile work environment case, em-
ployers will be able to assert the affrrmative defense the Court 
established.345 Because employers could be vicariously liable in 
a hostile environment case, the Court held that Ellerth should 
have had the opportunity to prove she had a claim for which 
Burlington may be held liable.346 It therefore remanded EI-
lerth's case to the district court, where Burlington could assert 
the affIrmative defense.347 
VI. CRITIQUE: AGENCY PRINCIPLES DEMAND VI-
CARIOUS LIABILITY IN ALL CASES OF SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT BY A SUPERVISOR 
A. THE ELLERTH RULE IS CONTRARY TO THE AGENCY 
PRINCIPLES STATED IN SECTION 219 OF THE RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth provided the ideal ve-
hicle for articulating the proper application of agency principles 
in determining employer liability for sexual harassment be-
cause Ellerth's claims did not comfortably fit into the prior 
341. See id. at 2264. 
342. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
343. See id. at 2265-2270. See also discussion supra Part II.D. 
344. See id. at 2270. 
345. See id. 
346. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 227l. 
347. See id. 
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rules. 348 Specifically, Ellerth's claims were a blend of hostile 
environment and quid pro quo harassment, illustrating the ar-
tificial nature of the distinction between the two types of claims 
as it applied to employer liability. 349 
The Court wisely used Ellerth's case to reject the use of 
"quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" as dispositive catego-
ries in sexual harassment cases.35O In so doing, the Court 
opened the door to plaintiffs like Kimberly Ellerth, whose 
claims do not fall comfortably into either category.351 At the 
heart of the Court's rejection of the categories is the recognition 
that vicarious employer liability should not depend entirely on 
what kind of harassment the plaintiff suffered when she, was 
harassed by her supervisor. 352 
If labeling claims as "quid pro quo" or "hostile environment" 
no longer determines the standard of employer liability, the 
Court should establish a bright line rule, imposing vicarious 
liability in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. 353 
Instead of relying on Meritor to limit employer liability, the 
Court should have followed the agency analysis as articulated 
in the 1980 EEOC guidelines, which imposed vicarious liability 
in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. 354 
One shortcoming of the Ellerth rule is that the type of har-
assment a plaintiff suffered will still, in large part, determine 
whether the employer will be vicariously liable.355 It is true 
that categorizing a plaintifl's claim as quid pro quo or hostile 
environment no longer determines the imposition of vicarious 
348. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. 
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998). 
349. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). 
350. See id. 
351. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(stating that Ellerth's is essentially a hostile environment claim with a quid pro quo 
component). 
352. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
353. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 153. 
354. See id. See also discussion supra section II.B. 
355. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. 
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998). 
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liability.356 The practical result of the Court's holding, however, 
is that whether a plaintiff suffered some form of economic in-
jury determines whether she can hold her employer vicariously 
liable.357 Without a tangible employment action, the employer 
will have the opportunity to defeat the imposition of vicarious 
liability.358 Thus, despite the Court's rejection of the categorical 
approach, in reality, its decision perpetuated the distinction 
between quid pro quo and hostile environment claims. 
Under the Ellerth rule, vicarious liability is automatic when 
the employee suffers a tangible employment action. 359 Because 
quid pro quo sexual harassment, by definition, results in a tan-
gible employment action against the victim, vicarious liability 
will automatically apply.360 If, instead, the employee did not 
suffer a tangible employment action, vicarious liability is not 
automatic because the employer may assert the affirmative 
defense.361 In the latter case, the employee, by defmition, was 
the victim of hostile work environment harassment. 362 As a 
result, the Court's holding is little more than a change in vo-
cabulary. 
Another problem with the Ellerth rule is its inconsistency 
with agency principles.363 Had the Court adhered more closely 
to section 219 in its agency application, the Court would not 
have established the affirmative defense.364 Indeed, the Court 
noted that the agency relation standard appeared to cover most 
of the misconduct that occurs in the workplace. 365 Unfortu-
356. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
357. See id. at 2270. 
358. See id. ("When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer 
may raise an affirmative defense .... ") (emphasis added). 
359. See id. 
360. See Henson v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing 29 
C.F.R. 1604.11(a)(1)(2)). 
361. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. 
362. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). 
363. Interview with David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law at Golden Gate Univ. 
School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 27, 1998). 
364. See id. 
365. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. 
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nately, the court declined to follow this line of reasoning to its 
logical result. 366 
B. APPLYING THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND AGENCY 
RELATION STANDARDS LEAD TO STRICT VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
FOR SEXUAL HARAsSMENT COMMITTED BY A SUPERVISOR 
There are at least two bases, found in Section 219, for im-
posing vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases.367 First, 
sexual harassment is within a supervisor's scope of employ-
ment because he is responsible for the work environment he 
oversees.366 For example, Slowik's duties included supervising 
Ellerth's work.369 Ellerth's work served Burlington's inter-
ests.370 Consequently, Slowik's supervision of those tasks were 
also for Burlington's benefit and therefore were within the 
scope of his employment.371 
Moreover, a supervisor's responsibility is not limited to per-
sonnel decisions; he is also charged with maintaining a safe 
and productive work environment.372 Sexual harassment 
366. See id. at 2270 (stating that Meritor required the Court to use agency 
principles to limit employer liability for sexual harassment committed by ~upervisors). 
367. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44 at 98-99 (describing three bases for imposing 
vicarious liability for sexual harassment by supervisors). 
368. See id. at 80. There are at least three definitions of scope of employment. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957), which defines scope of employment 
as: "1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: a) it is of 
the kind he is employed to perform; b) it occurs substantially within the authorized 
time and space limits; c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
master, and d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of 
force is not unexpectable by the master." Alternatively, Seavey states that conduct is 
within the scope of employment "if it can be said rationally that the employment is the 
primary cause of the tort." WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF AGENCY § 
87 cmt. a (1964). Prosser and Keeton state that scope of employment encompasses 
"acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so 
fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even 
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment." W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 at 502 (5th ed. 
1984). 
369. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848,859-860 (7th Cir. 1996), 
vacated en bane, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
370. See id. 
371. See id. 
372. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
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clearly impacts both the safety and productivity of the work 
environment.373 
Sexual harassment is readily analogous to other conduct 
which has been found to be within the scope of employment. 374 
Horseplay is one example.375 In Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk 
Mills,376 the New York Court of Appeals found that horseplay 
between employees was within the scope of employment be-
cause it should be expected.377 The employer should have ex-
pected the workmen in its factory to engage in pranks and 
jokes because such conduct from the men was "inseparable 
from factory life."378 Thus, foreseeability, in part, determines 
whether conduct is within the scope of employment. 379 
Similarly, sexual harassment is a known problem in the 
workplace.380 Sexual innuendoes, advances, and harassment 
characterize the modern workplace just as pranks between fac-
tory workers were a characteristic of workplaces in the 1920s. 
That so many employers today have policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment indicates that employers expect harassment to oc-
373. See 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 46.01(2) (Matthew Bender, 1998) 
(citing SandrofT, Se:cual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988 
at 69.) "A typical Fortune 500 company spends as much as $6.7 million a year in 
sexual harassment costs due to absenteeism, turnover and lost productivity.n [d. See 
also Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence ~ainst Women in the 
Workplace, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, Oct. 1993 at 1072 (describing the consequences 
of sexual harassment to employers and victims). 
374. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286·2287 (1998). 
375. See e.g., Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920) 
(employer was found vicariously liable for an eye injury sustained by an employee 
when another employee threw an apple at him). Judge Cardozo described horseplay in 
that case as " ... a moment of diversion from work to joke with or playa prank upon a 
fellow workman.n [d. See also Blunk v. Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. Co., 217 P.2d 494, 495 
(Cal. 1950) (describing horseplay as "sportive actsn). These definitions are not meant to 
suggest that sexual harassment involves the same kind of prankish behavior that 
occurred in these cases. Rather, the use of horseplay cases is merely to illustrate the 
fact that such conduct, like sexual harassment, is foreseeable by the employer. 
376. 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920). 
377. See Leonbruno, 128 N.E. at 711. 
378. [d. 
379. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (describing cases that used a broad 
definition of "scope of employmentn). 
380. See id. at 2288. 
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cur.381 The fact that employers can foresee and prevent sexual 
harassment in the workplace is therefore a basis for imposing 
vicarious liability. 
Second, the agency relation standard, as Ellerth makes 
clear, appears to cover a broad range of workplace miscon-
duct.382 The agency relation standard imposes vicarious liabil-
ity when an employee is able to commit the tort because of his 
employment.383 The supervisor's ability to harass his subordi-
nate is "facilitated by [his] position of authority."384 Without his 
supervisory position, he would not have leverage over the em-
ployees he supervises.385 He is able to call employees into his 
office for meetings, reprimands, or other work-related discus-
sions.386 In the course of these interactions, the supervisor has 
the opportunity to sexually harass his subordinate.387 The fact 
that someone in authority is subjecting a worker to harassment 
reinforces an employee's reluctance to resist advances or com-
plain.388 Thus, contrary to the Court's opinion, a broad reading 
of the agency relation standard is appropriate in sexual har-
assment cases. 
Ellerth provides several examples of how a supervisor's re-
lationship with the employer helps the supervisor commit har-
assment.389 First, Slowik told Ellerth that he could "make [her] 
life very hard or very easy at Burlington."390 In making this 
threat, Slowik undeniably relied on the power delegated to him 
by Burlington. The fact that Slowik did not actually terminate, 
demote, or deny r~ises to Ellerth is immaterial because he had 
381. See 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 46.01(2) (Matthew Bender, 1998) 
(citing Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988 
at 69, 71). Of 160 Fortune 500 companies, 76% had written policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment. See id. 
382. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. 
383. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957). 
384. Alan Q. Sykes, The &undaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of 
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 606 
(1988). 
385. See id. at 606-607. 
386. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 88. 
387. See id. 
388. See id. at 88-89. See also Sykes, supra note 384, at 606. 
389. See Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1107. 
390. Id. 
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already linked the conditions of her employment to her toler-
ance of his advances.391 Then, Slowik made Ellerth's life at 
Burlington "very hard" by continuing to harass her.392 Second, 
Slowik's reluctance to promote Ellerth because she was "not 
loose enough" demonstrates his wilJjngness to use his supervi-
sory power against her if she did not accept advances. 393 Third, 
the fact that Slowik could pursue Ellerth for so long illustrates 
the coercive power of a supervisor's authority; she was too 
afraid of what would happen to her if she complained to anyone 
at Burlington.394 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As Ellerth's case demonstrates, the Supreme Court took the 
necessary step of rejecting "quid pro quo" and "hostile envi-
ronment" harassment as categories for determining the stan-
dard of employer liability. 395 Thus, under Ellerth, plaintiffs 
whose claims do not comfortably fit into one of these two cate-
gories may still be able to impose vicarious liability on their 
employers. Unfortunately, the Court failed to precisely apply 
thE:. proper scope of employment and agency relation standards. 
A precise application of these .standards demands vicarious li-
ability in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. The 
Supreme Court in Ellerth adopted Meritor's dictum that agency 
principles limited employer liability, and therefore declined to 
properly apply agency principles to Kimberly Ellerth's 
391. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,778 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that 
Urban's threats to terminate Karibian if she did not comply with his sexual demands 
amounted to sexual harassment because he "linked tangible job benefits to the 
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances.n The fact that Karibian was promoted, and 
not terminated, did not change the analysis). Similarly, in Ellerth's case, Slowik linked 
tangible job benefits (continued employment, making her life at Burlington easy or 
difficult) to Ellerth's acceptance or rejection of his advances. See Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. 
at 1107, 1108 (describing Slowk's threat to make Ellerth's life easy or difficult, his 
hesitations about promoting Ellerth because she was not "loose enoughn and his denial 
of her request for a special customer order because she would not describe what she 
was wearing). 
392. See Ellerth I, 912 F. Supp. at 1106·1109 (describing Slowik's harassment of 
Ellerth). 
393. Id. at 1108. 
394. See id. at 1117. 
395. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). 
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claims.396 As a result, a bright-line standard of employer li-
ability in Title VII sexual harassment cases continues to elude 
courts and commentators in this important area of law. 
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